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Abstract
Potential games, originally introduced in the early 1990’s by Lloyd
Shapley, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics, and his colleague Dov
Monderer, are a very important class of models in game theory. They
have special properties such as the existence of Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. This note introduces graphical versions of potential games.
Special cases of graphical potential games have already found applicabil-
ity in many areas of science and engineering beyond economics, includ-
ing artificial intelligence, computer vision, and machine learning. They
have been effectively applied to the study and solution of important real-
world problems such as routing and congestion in networks, distributed
resource allocation (e.g., public goods), and relaxation-labeling for im-
age segmentation. Implicit use of graphical potential games goes back
at least 40 years. Several classes of games considered standard in the
literature, including coordination games, local interaction games, lattice
games, congestion games, and party-affiliation games, are instances of
graphical potential games. This note provides several characterizations
of graphical potential games by leveraging well-known results from the
literature on probabilistic graphical models. A major contribution of the
work presented here that particularly distinguishes it from previous work
is establishing that the convergence of certain type of game-playing rules
implies that the agents/players must be embedded in some graphical po-
tential game.
1 Introduction
Potential games [Monderer and Shapley, 1996] have become an inherently im-
portant class of models in game theory. Potential games have special properties
such as the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. By now, potential
games are so fundamental and core to game theory that their study is of broad
interest.
This note introduces graphical potential games, a graphical version of clas-
sical potential games. Implicit use of graphical potential games goes back at
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least 40 years. Special cases of graphical potential games have already found
applicability in many areas of science and engineering beyond economics. These
areas include artificial intelligence and computer vision [Miller and Zucker, 1991,
Yu and Berthod, 1995, Berthod et al., 1996], machine learning [Rezek et al.,
2008], neural networks [Hopfield, 1982, Miller and Zucker, 1991], theoretical
computer science, computational social science and sociology [Montanari and Saberi,
2009, 2010], and dynamical systems [Miller and Zucker, 1991, Zucker, 2001].
They have been effectively applied to the study and solution of important
real-world problems such as routing and congestion in networks [Rosenthal,
1973], distributed resource allocation such as public goods [Heikkinen, 2006],
relaxation-labeling for image segmentation [Rosenfeld et al., 1976, Miller and Zucker,
1991, Zucker, 2001, Yu and Berthod, 1995, Berthod et al., 1996], clustering and
probabilistic inference in graphical models via learning in games [Rezek et al.,
2008], equilibrium-selection in strategic settings [Young, 1993], the emergence of
coordination from individual agent’s strategic behavior [Blume, 1995], the rate
at which innovations and norms/conventions spread through a social network
and the role of the network structure [Montanari and Saberi, 2009, 2010], and
inference in Hopfield networks [Hopfield, 1982]. (Please refer to the given refer-
ence for details.) Several classes of games considered standard in the literature,
including coordination games, local interaction games [Montanari and Saberi,
2009, 2010], lattice games [Blume, 1993], congestion games [Rosenthal, 1973],
and party-affiliation games [Fabrikant et al., 2004], are instances of graphical
potential games.
Potential games, like normal-form games, do not have an inherently compact,
graphical representation, in contrast to graphical games [Kearns et al., 2001].
Not all potential games are non-trivial graphical games. In a graphical game,
the payoff function of each player is a function of its neighbors in the game
graph. Any definition of a graphical game must respect that. But the potential
function of a potential game is global : it involves all players! That means
that we can only use certain types of potential functions to define a graphical
potential game.
This note provides several, strong characterizations of graphical potential
games by leveraging well-known results from the literature on probabilistic
graphical models. A major contribution of the work presented here that partic-
ularly distinguishes it from previous work is establishing that the convergence
of certain type of game-playing rules implies that the agents/players must be
embedded in some graphical potential game. At this point, it is best to delay
the discussion of the most closely related work in economics and, more recently,
computer science until the end of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
This section introduces basic notation and concepts in graphical models and
game theory.
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Basic Notation. Denote by x ≡ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) an n-dimensional vector
and by x−i ≡ (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) the same vector without component
i. Similarly, for every set S ⊂ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n}, denote by xS ≡ (xi : i ∈ S) the
(sub-)vector formed from x using only components in S, such that, letting Sc ≡
[n] − S denote the complement of S, we can denote x ≡ (xS , xSc) ≡ (xi, x−i)
for every i. If A1, . . . , An are sets, denote by A ≡ ×i∈[n]Ai, A−i ≡ ×j∈[n]−{i}Aj
and AS ≡ ×j∈SAj .
Graph Terminology and Notation. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected
graph, with finite set of n vertices or nodes V = [n] and a set of (undirected)
edges E. For each node i, let N (i) ≡ {j | (i, j) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors of
i in G, not including i, and N(i) ≡ N (i) ∪ {i} the set including i. A clique C
of G is a set of nodes with the property that they are all mutually connected:
for all i, j ∈ C, (i, j) ∈ E; in addition, C is maximal if there is no other node
k outside C that is also connected to each node in C, i.e., for all k ∈ V − C,
(k, i) /∈ E for some i ∈ C.
Another useful concept in the context of this note is that of hypergraphs,
which are generalizations of regular graphs. A hypergraph G = (V, E) is defined
by a set of nodes V and a set of hyperedges E ⊂ 2V . We can think of the
hyperedges as cliques in a regular graph.
2.1 Graphical Models
Graphical models [Koller and Friedman, 2009] are an elegant marriage of statis-
tics and graph theory that has had tremendous impact in the theory and practice
of modern statistics. It has permitted effective modeling of large, structured
high-dimensional complex systems found in the real world. The language of
graphical models allows us to capture the probabilistic structure of complex
interactions between individual entities in the system. The core component of
the model is a graph in which each node i corresponds to a random variable Xi
and missing edges express conditional independence assumptions about those
random variables in the probabilistic system.
2.1.1 Markov Random Fields, Gibbs Distributions and the Hammersley-
Clifford Theorem
A joint probability distribution P is called a Markov random field (MRF) with
respect to an undirected graphG if for all x, for every node i, P (Xi = xi | X−i =
x−i) = P (Xi = xi | XN (i) = xN (i)). In that case, the neighbors/variables XN (i)
form the Markov blanket of node/variable Xi.
A joint distribution P is called a Gibbs distribution with respect to a an
undirected graphG if it can be expressed as P (X = x) =
∏
C∈C ΦC(xC) for some
functions ΦC indexed by a clique C ∈ C, the set of all (maximal) cliques in G,
and mapping every possible value xC that the random variables XC associated
with the nodes in C can take to a non-negative number.
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Let us say that joint probability distribution P is positive if it has full support
(i.e., P (x) > 0 for all x).
Theorem 1. [Hammersley-Clifford] [Hammersley and Clifford, 1971] Let P
be a positive joint probability distribution. Then, P is an MRF with respect to
G if and only if P is a Gibbs distribution with respect to G.
In the context of the theorem, the functions ΦC are positive, which allows
us to define MRFs in terms of local potential functions {φC} over each clique
C in the graph. Define the function Ψ(x) ≡
∑
C∈C φC(xC). Let us refer to
any function of this form as a Gibbs potential with respect to G. Thanks to
the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem, a more familiar expression of an MRF is
P (X = x) ∝ exp(
∑
C∈C φC(xC)) = exp(Ψ(x)).
2.2 Game Theory and Graphical Games
Let V = [n] denote a finite set of n players in a game. For each player i ∈ V ,
let Ai denote the (finite) set of actions or pure strategies that i can play. Let A
denote the set of joint actions , x ≡ (xi, . . . , xn) ∈ A denote a joint action, and
xi the individual action of player i in x. Denote by x−i the joint action of all
the players except i, such that x ≡ (xi, x−i). Let Mi : A→ R denote the payoff
function of player i.
There are a variety of compact representations for large game inspired by
probabilistic graphical models in AI and machine learning [La Mura, 2000,
Kearns et al., 2001, Koller and Milch, 2003, Leyton-Brown and Tennenholtz, 2003,
Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2008]. This paper’s context is graphical games [Kearns et al.,
2001], a simple but powerful model inspired by probabilistic graphical models
such as MRFs.
A graphical game [Kearns et al., 2001] is defined by an undirected graph
(V,E) and a set of local payoff hypermatrices {M ′i : AN(i) → R | i ∈ V }.
Each node i ∈ V in the graph corresponds to a player in the game and its
payoff function Mi(x) ≡ M ′i(xN(i)) is defined by its local payoff hypermatrix
M ′i , a function of the actions of the players in the neighborhood N(i) of i
only, which includes i. A hypergraphical game [Papadimitriou, 2005] is defined
by a hypergraph (V, E) and sets of “local” payoffs hypermatrices of the form
{M ′i,C : AC → R | C ∈ E , i ∈ C}. Let Ci ≡ {C ∈ E | i ∈ C} be the
set of cliques in which i participates. The payoff function of player i in a
hypergraphical game is defined as Mi(x) ≡
∑
C∈Ci
M ′i,C(xC). Note that the
payoff function of player i only depends directly on the actions of players in
its neighborhood N(i) = ∪C∈CiC = {j ∈ V | i, j ∈ C for some C ∈ E}, which
includes i. A polymatrix game [Janovskaja, 1968] is a hypergraphical game in
which C = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ V, j 6= i}, which is the set of cliques of pairs of
nodes involving the player and every other player. If, instead, the hyperedge
set of each player is some (possibly different) subset of {{i, j} | j ∈ V, j 6= i},
then let us call the game a graphical polymatrix game. Finally, let us say that a
hypergraphical game is hyperedge-symmetric if, in addition, for every hyperedge
C containing players i, j in the game, we have that M ′i,C = M
′
j,C ≡ M
′
C ; if, in
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particular, the hypergraphical game is a graphical polymatrix game, then let us
say that the game is pairwise-symmetric.
3 Graphical Potential Games
This section introduces graphical potential games (and other related subclasses)
and provides some structural properties and characterizations of such games.
Previous work in probabilistic graphical models facilitate the derivations of the
results.
Definition 1. Consider a graph G with (non-inclusive) neighbor sets N (i) for
each payer i. For any graphical game with graph G, and for each player i,
consider some function fi : R × AN (i) → R. Let us say that the function fi is
a (conditional) preference-order-preserving transform for player i if fi(v, xN (i))
is a (strictly) monotonically increasing function of v for every xN (i) ∈ AN (i).
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Let us call the transform (unconditionally) linear with respect to some positive
weight wi if it takes the form fi(v, xN (i)) = wiv. Let us denote by f
−1
i the
corresponding (conditional) inverse function of fi; that is, f
−1
i : R×AN (i) → R
such that for all v ∈ R and xN (i) ∈ AN (i), we have f
−1
i (fi(v, xN (i)), xN (i)) = v.
Denote by f ≡ {fi} and f−1 ≡ {f
−1
i } the set of preference-order-preserving
transforms fi and their inverses, respectively, one for each player i. Let us
say that a function Ψ is a f -transformed potential for a graphical game with
neighbor sets {N (i)} and local payoff matrices {M ′i} if for all i, xN (i), and
xi, x
′
i, M
′
i(xi, xN (i))−M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)) = fi(Ψ(xi, x−i)−Ψ(x
′
i, x−i), xN (i)) . Let us
call a graphical game with a f -transformed potential a graphical f -transformed
potential game.
We can generalize the terminology of Monderer and Shapley [1996] to graph-
ical games. Let w be a positive weight vector. If the transformed fi of each
player i is (unconditionally) linear with weight wi, then Ψ is called a (weighted)
w-potential for the game. If wi = 1 for all i, then Ψ is called an (exact) potential .
Finally, let us say that Ψ is an ordinal potential for a graphical game with neigh-
bor sets {N (i)} and local payoff matrices {M ′i} if it satisfy the following condi-
tion: M ′i(xi, xN (i))−M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)) > 0 if and only if Ψ(xi, x−i)−Ψ(x
′
i, x−i) > 0
for all i, xi, x
′
i and xN (i). Let us refer to a graphical game with a (weighted)
w-potential, (exact) potential or ordinal potential as a graphical (weighted) w-
potential, (exact) potential or ordinal potential game, respectively.
4 Characterizing Graphical Potential Games
The following theorem characterizes graphical f -transformed potential games:
the potential function is the sum of local potential functions over each (maximal)
clique in the game graph.
1Monderer and Shapley [1996] considered such transforms in the context of (variants of)
fictitious play.
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Theorem 2. Every potential of a graphical transformed potential game with
graph G is a Gibbs potential with respect to G.
Proof. The proof is based on an application of the Hammersley-Clifford Theo-
rem (Theorem 1). Let Ψ be the f -transformed potential of the graphical game.
Define P as a joint probability distribution such that P (X = x) ∝ exp(Ψ(x))
for all x. (Thus, P is positive.) The following derivation shows that P is an
MRF with respect to the game graph G: for all i, xi, x−i,
P (Xi = xi | X−i = x−i)
=
exp(Ψ(xi, x−i))∑
x′
i
exp(Ψ(x′i, x−i))
=
1∑
x′
i
exp(Ψ(x′i, x−i)−Ψ(xi, x−i))
=
1∑
x′
i
exp(f−1i (M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i))−M
′
i(xi, xN (i)), xN (i)))
.
Hence, by the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem (Theorem 1), P is also a Gibbs
distribution with respect to the graph G of the game. In particular, let C be
the set of (maximal) cliques of G. There exist a local potential function φ′C for
each (maximal) clique C ∈ C defining a global potential function Ψ′ as Ψ′(x) =∑
C∈C φ
′
C(xC) such that P (X = x) ∝ exp(Ψ
′(x)). Let Z =
∑
x exp(Ψ(x)) and
Z ′ =
∑
x exp(Ψ
′(x)) be the normalizing constant when expressing P in terms
of Ψ and Ψ′, respectively, denote by c ≡ ln(Z/Z ′), a constant. Then we have
that for all x, Ψ(x) = Ψ′(x) + c. Defining local potential for Ψ as, for example,
φC(xC) ≡ φ′C(x) + c/|C| completes the proof.
In view of the strong equivalence established by the last theorem, let us
refer to a graphical transformed potential game as a transformed Gibbs-potential
game (with the same graph); and similarly for weighted and exact potentials.
Whether every graphical ordinal potential game has an (equivalent) ordinal
Gibbs potential is left open. So, let us define an ordinal Gibbs-potential game
as a graphical game that has a Gibbs potential with respect to the graph of the
game.
The following definitions are useful to present the main corollary of the last
theorem.
Definition 2. Given an n-dimensional positive weight vector w, let us say that
a game with payoff hypermatrices {M1i } is w-scaled payoff-difference equivalent
to another game with the same players and payoff hypermatrices {M2i } if for
all i, x−i, xi, x
′
i, we have that M
1
i (xi, x−i) − M
1
i (x
′
i, x−i) = wi(M
2
i (xi, x−i) −
M2i (x
′
i, x−i)). If w is the vector of all 1’s, then let us simply say that the game
is payoff-difference equivalent to the other. 2
2Note that in any two (w-scaled) payoff-difference-equivalent games, every player achieves
exactly the same (w-scaled) expected regrets with respect to any (fixed, possibly correlated)
joint-mixed strategy.
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Definition 3. Let us say that a graph has totally disconnected or open neigh-
borhoods if for every node of the graph, every subgraph induced by the neighbors
of the node is the empty graph; in other words, there is no edge connecting any
pair of neighbors of any node in the graph; formally, if E is the edge set, then
for all i and j, k ∈ N (i), j 6= k, we have (j, k) /∈ E.
Some simple examples of graphs with totally disconnected neighborhoods
are trees, cycles, and grids.
Corollary 1. Any w-weighted Gibbs-potential game with graph G and poten-
tial Ψ is w-scaled payoff-difference equivalent to a hyperedge-symmetric hyper-
graphical game in which each hyperedge is a (maximal) clique C in G and has
as corresponding hypermatrix the local potential associated to C in Ψ. If, in
addition, G has totally disconnected neighborhoods then the equivalence is to
pairwise-symmetric graphical polymatrix games. 3
It is important to note the implication of the last corollary. In general, there
is no reason to expect, a priori, just from the definition of a graphical potential
game with, say for example, a tree graph that the differences in payoff matrix for
a player would not be arbitrary functions of the action of the player and those
of its neighbors. The corollary tells us that this is not possible in this case: the
payoff hypermatrices difference must be sums of simple pairwise matrices, each
being a simple 2-dimensional matrix depending on the actions of the player and
one of its neighbors. The same holds for cycles, grids and similar structures,
and their corresponding generalizations, including those to higher dimensions.
The following proposition completes the connection in the reverse direction.
Proposition 1. Any hyperedge-symmetric hypergraphical game is a graphical
Gibbs-potential game.
5 Smooth Best-Response Play and Graphical Gibbs-
Potential Games
Let us consider a sequential process of play in which there is a pre-specified order
by which the players play and at each time step t exactly one player plays by
choosing an action xti.
4 In the sequel, let us take the sequence of play to be,
without loss of generality, the sequence 1, 2, . . . , n. Let us say that a player has
a (time-homogeneous, first-order) Markov playing scheme if it has a (possibly
randomized) policy, or plan, by which the agent selects an action based only on
the last actions played by the other players; more formally, if the policy pi is a
conditional probability distribution pi(xi | x−i) such that if player i is to play
3See Appendix (Missing Proofs) for all missing proofs.
4This process may be relaxed to allow certain dynamic variations in the order of play and
some kinds of simultaneous moves. The process is also related to (smooth versions of) the
Cournot adjustment process with lock-in and to stochastic adjustment models in the literature
on learning in games [Fudenberg and Levine, 1999].
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at time t+1 and xt−i are the last joint-actions that player i observed the others
take, then player i chooses to play action xt+1i = xi with probability pi(xi | x
t
−i)
(i.e., xt+1i ∼ pi(. | x
t
−i)).
5 For a graphical game, let us further say that the
playing scheme is local if it only depends on the last actions of its neighbors in
the game graph.
Property 1. In a graphical game with graph G, the sequential process of play
generated by Markov playing schemes of the type described above, and that are
local with respect to G, is equivalent to realizations generated by running the
Gibbs sampler [Geman and Geman, 1984] with conditional distributions given
by the individual player’s playing scheme.
For every round r = 1, 2, . . . composed of consecutive time steps of length n,
denote by zr = (zr1 , . . . , z
r
n) the play (joint-action) outcome at round r, so that
for all i, zri = x
(r−1)n+i
i (i.e., the joint-action generated during round r by the
sequential process of play). Let us refer to the total sequence generated by zr for
r = 1, 2, . . . , T as the empirical play up to round T (i.e., after nT rounds). Let us
say that an empirical play (conditionally) converges starting from an initially
assigned play x0 if the empirical joint-probability distribution defined by the
empirical play converges (almost surely) to some joint probability distribution
as we let the sequential process of play run for an infinite number of rounds
(i.e., for every joint-action x, if we denote the empirical distribution of play
after T rounds as P̂T (x) ≡ 1
T
∑T
r=1 1[z
r = x], then P̂∞(x) ≡ limT→∞ P̂T (x)
exists, with probability one.) Let us refer to a set of playing schemes, one for
each player, as a playing procedure for the game. Furthermore, let us say that
a playing procedure is consistent (or globally convergent) if the empirical play
generated is convergent to the same joint distribution P̂∞(x) from any initial
joint play x0.
Let us say that a player i with payoff function Mi uses a smooth best-
response (SBR) playing scheme pi with respect to a (conditional) preference-
order-preserving transform fi : R × A−i → R, if for all x−i, we have pi(xi |
x−i) ∝ exp(fi(Mi(xi, x−i), x−i). If, instead, the fi’s above are such that the
ratio pi(xi | x−i)/pi(x′i | x−i) = exp(fi(Mi(xi, x−i)−Mi(x
′
i, x−i), x−i)), then let
us call the scheme a smooth best-response-difference (SBRD) playing scheme. 6
Recall from the previous discussion that, for a graphical game, a player’s (play-
ing) scheme is local with respect to the game graph, if it only depends on the
actions of its neighbors in that graph. In the case of SBR and SBRD schemes,
in general, this requires that the domain of the second argument to fi be AN (i).
Finally, let us say that the game has a (local, Markov) playing procedure if every
player uses a (local, Markov) playing scheme.
The following theorems and corollaries provide another characterization of
graphical potential games.
5Although not pursued in this paper, more complex playing scheme could in principle be
considered.
6This condition implies that fi(v, x−i) = −fi(−v, x−i) and pi(xi | x−i) =
1/(
∑
x
′
i
exp(fi(Mi(x′i, x−i)−Mi(xi, x−i), x−i)).
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Theorem 3. Any graphical game with graph G that has a consistent (Markov)
local SBR playing procedure is an ordinal Gibbs-potential game with graph G. If,
in particular, the transform fi used by each player i is (unconditionally) linear
with weight 1/wi, then the game is a w-weighted Gibbs-potential game. If the
playing procedure is SBRD, instead of SBR, then the game is a f−1-transformed
Gibbs-potential game, where f−1 denote the inverses of the transforms f used
by the players for the SBRD scheme.
Proof. As noted in Property 1, the playing procedure is equivalent to the Gibbs
sampler. The Markov chain associated with the Gibbs sampler is regular be-
cause all the conditional probabilities associated with the players’ schemes are
positive. Because the procedure is convergent the limiting empirical distribu-
tion of play P̂ is the (unique) MRF consistent with the conditional proba-
bility distributions. Because P̂ is positive, by the Hammersley-Clifford The-
orem (Theorem 1), P̂ is also a Gibbs distribution with respect to the graph
of the game G. Denote by Ψ̂ the Gibbs potential of P̂ . Also, denote by
Ẑi(x−i) ≡
∑
x′
i
exp(Ψ̂(x′i, x−i)) the normalizing constant for the marginal dis-
tribution over all the variables except i with respect to P̂ . Similarly, denote
by Zi(xN (i)) ≡
∑
x′
i
exp(fi(M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i))) the normalizing constant of
the player’s scheme. The conditionals of MRF P̂ must satisfy the following
condition:
exp(Ψ̂(xi, x−i))
Ẑi(x−i)
= P̂ (Xi = xi | X−i = x−i)
= P̂ (Xi = xi | XN (i) = xN (i))
= pi(xi | xN (i))
=
exp(fi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i)), xN (i)))
Zi(xN (i))
.
From the last equality, we obtain that for all xi, x−i,
fi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i))) = Ψ̂(xi, x−i) + ln(Zi(xN (i))/Ẑi(x−i)) .
Because the second term on the right hand side of the last equation does not
depend on xi, we can obtain that for all x−i and every pair xi, x
′
i,
fi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i)), xN (i))− fi(M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i))
= Ψ̂(xi, x−i)− Ψ̂(x
′
i, x−i) . (1)
Because the fi’s are (strictly) monotonically increasing with their first argument,
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we have
Ψ̂(xi, x−i)− Ψ̂(x
′
i, x−i) > 0
⇐⇒ fi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i)), xN (i))−
fi(M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i)) > 0
⇐⇒ fi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i)), xN (i)) > fi(M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i))
⇐⇒ M ′i(xi, xN (i)) > M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i))
⇐⇒ M ′i(xi, xN (i))−M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)) > 0 .
This completes the proof of the first statement.
The second statement in the theorem follows by noting that in the case of
(unconditionally) linear transforms with weight wi, we have that the left-hand
side of Equation 1 above becomes fi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i)), xN (i))−fi(M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i)) =
wiM
′
i(xi, xN (i))− wiM
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i)) = wi(M
′
i(xi, xN (i))−M
′
i(x
′
i, xN (i))).
The case of SBRD procedure is similar, but simpler:
exp(fi(Mi(xi, xN (i))−Mi(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i)))
=
pi(xi | xN (i))
pi(x′i | xN (i))
= exp(Ψ̂(xi, x−i)− Ψ̂(x
′
i, x−i)) .
Hence, we haveMi(xi, xN (i))−Mi(x
′
i, xN (i)) = f
−1
i (Ψ̂(xi, x−i)−Ψ̂(x
′
i, x−i), xN (i)).
Using the definition of a graphical transformed potential game completes the
proof.
The next proposition completes the characterization of transformed Gibbs-
potential games as exactly those that have consistent local Markov SBRD play-
ing procedures.
Proposition 2. Any f -transformed Gibbs-potential game with graph G has a
consistent Markov SBRD playing procedure that is local with respect to G and
each player uses the inverse transforms of f in their playing scheme. If, in
particular, the game is a w-weighted Gibbs-potential game, then it also has an
SBR procedure with the same properties.
Whether the last theorem extends to graphical ordinal potential games is
left open.
Closing Remarks on Related Work. A connection, obtained indepen-
dently from the one in this paper, between potential games and MRFs ap-
peared in previous work in economics and game theory [Ellison, 1993, Blume,
1993, Kandori et al., 1993, Young, 1993, Blume, 1995], and more recently in the
theoretical CS community [Montanari and Saberi, 2009, 2010].
In all that previous work, the interest and goal for making the connection
is different than the one here. Roughly speaking, their connection was via very
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specific “game-playing rules” (e.g., the logit rule and its limiting version, the so
called myopic/deterministic/strict best-response rule) on very specific classes of
games (e.g., coordination games). Their interest was the nature of the steady
state induced by playing some specific-type of rule in some specific kind of game,
and sometimes also establishing bounds on the convergence rate to steady state
behavior [Montanari and Saberi, 2009, 2010]. That previous work showed that
the steady state of running such a rule in a specific type of graphical game called
a local interaction game is an MRF with respect to the graph of the specific type
of game.
The results presented here are more general in the type of game-playing
procedures considered for the characterization. This work does not study limit-
ing cases such as (myopic/deterministic/strict) best-response, nor does it study
convergence rates.
No previous work provides a connection in the other direction: if certain type
of game-playing rule converges, then the players must be embedded in some
graphical potential game.
From a technical perspective, by invoking known results from probabilistic
graphical models (e.g., Hammersley-Clifford Theorem [Hammersley and Clifford,
1971, Besag, 1974] and convergence of the Gibbs sampler [Geman and Geman,
1984]), the derivation of our results simplified considerably. Interestingly, the
proofs for the previous results appear to be specific versions of those typically
used to prove the “hard” direction of the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem. 7
A Appendix: Missing Proofs
This appendix contains all the proofs left out of the main body of the paper.
A.1 Proof of Corollary 1
The proof follows from Theorem 2 by applying the respective definitions. For
the last statement of the corollary, in particular, note that the maximal cliques
of a graph with disconnected neighborhoods are exactly the edges of the graph.
Hence, each local potential is pairwise in that case, and the payoff difference is
the sum of differences of local pairwise potentials, as is the case in any graphical
polymatrix games, by definition.
7Also, in some cases, the proofs in previous work use more sophisticated mathematical
tools because they want to understand what happens to the unique stable distribution as the
best-response becomes deterministic in the limit. They use a dynamical-system framework
and apply tools such as the Strong Ergodic Theorem to prove the existence of the limit of
the stable distributions, as the best-response rule becomes more myopic/deterministic/strict.
The typical reference given is Karlin and Taylor [1975].
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
For each hyperedge C in the hypergraphical game, define a corresponding local
potential φC(xC) ≡ M ′C(xC) as the local-clique payoff matrix for C. Defining
the Gibbs potential using those local potentials and with the graph being the
primal graph of the hypergraph, which is an undirected graph with the same
vertex set as the hypergraph but where there is an edge between two nodes if
there is a hyperedge containing both nodes. 8
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let Ψ be the Gibbs potential of the game. Define the SBRD playing scheme for
each player using the inverse f−1i of the corresponding game transform, such
that
pi(xi | xN (i))
pi(x′i | xN (i))
≡ exp(f−1i (Mi(xi, xN (i))−Mi(x
′
i, xN (i)), xN (i)))
= exp(Ψ̂(xi, x−i)− Ψ̂(x
′
i, x−i))
where the second equality follows from the definition of transformed poten-
tial games. The scheme is local by construction. Because Ψ is a Gibbs po-
tential, by the Hammersley-Clifford Theorem (Theorem 1), there is a positive
joint (global) MRF consistent with the conditional distributions induced by the
scheme. Hence, running the Gibbs sampler will always converge, regardless of
initial conditions. Because the playing procedure is equivalent to running the
Gibbs sampler (Property 1), the corresponding empirical distribution of play
will always converge to the same Gibbs distribution with potential Ψ. Thus,
the procedure will be consistent.
In the special case of a w-weighted Gibbs-potential game, then each player
i’s scheme takes the form
pi(xi | xN (i)) =
exp(Mi(xi, xN (i))/wi)∑
x′
i
exp(Mi(x′i, xN (i))/wi)
which corresponds to an SBR with a (unconditionally) linear transform with
weight 1/wi.
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